

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION:
INSIGHTS INTO IRAQ

by

Colonel Richard C. Stockhausen
United States Army

Professor Douglas Johnson
Project Adviser

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ABSTRACT

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By invading Iraq, removing Saddam Hussein's regime from power, dismantling the Ba'athist-controlled structures of government and civil administration, and guiding Iraq toward a democratic form of government, the United States and its coalition partners precipitated revolutionary change in Iraq. Although not a 'revolution' in the classic sense, this 'imposed' revolution set into motion socio-political forces that appear to have replicated the patterns and dynamics of classic revolutions as presented by Crane Brinton in his seminal work, *Anatomy of a Revolution*. By using the patterns and dynamics of revolution in an analytical framework, one can gain insight into the challenges to be faced in Iraq and the actions the Coalition will need to take to achieve its objectives in Iraq.

This paper first establishes the basis for the premise that revolution has been imposed in Iraq. It then reviews the classic patterns and dynamics associated with the revolutionary overthrow of a government outlined by Crane Brinton. The paper then demonstrates that these patterns can be seen in the developments in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. It then explores the implications that these patterns, and their underlying dynamics, have for the future course of events in Iraq. It also explores several factors that may act as variables to modify the dynamics and the resulting patterns of events.

The paper identifies three significant deviations in Iraq from Brinton's classic model: the 'tri-furcated' nature of Iraqi society created by the divisions between Arab Sunnis, Arab Shias, and Kurds; the lack of pre-revolutionary conditions in Iraq prior to the fall of Saddam; and the presence of the Coalition itself. It also identifies seven variables that may be manipulated to either enhance or detract from the eventual outcome in Iraq. These variables include: leadership; control of the instruments of government; control of the 'revolutionary powerbase;' economic well-being; external threats; internal threats; and sectarian friction. Based on these deviations and variables, the paper makes a number of recommendations for Coalition actions in Iraq.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
THE PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION: INSIGHTS INTO IRAQ	1
REVOLUTION IN IRAQ?.....	1
THE DYNAMICS AND PATTERNS OF REVOLUTION.....	2
DYNAMICS AND PATTERNS IN IRAQ.....	5
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ'S FUTURE.....	10
AFFECTING THE PATTERN.....	12
THE WAY AHEAD.....	21
ENDNOTES	23
GLOSSARY	31
BIBLIOGRAPHY	33

THE PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION: INSIGHTS INTO IRAQ

By invading Iraq, removing Saddam Hussein's regime from power, dismantling the Ba'athist-controlled structures of government and civil administration, and guiding Iraq toward a democratic form of government, the United States and its coalition partners precipitated revolutionary change in Iraq.¹ Although not a 'revolution' in the classic sense, this 'imposed' revolution set into motion socio-political forces that appear to have replicated the patterns and dynamics of classic revolutions.² The course of events in Iraq over the last twenty-two months—to include much of the violence and upheaval—can be seen as reflections of the common patterns and dynamics associated with the revolutionary overthrow of a government. If these dynamics truly are at work in Iraq, as they appear to be, then it has significant implications for the likely future course of events there. By extension, it also has implications for required Coalition action may to enhance a successful endstate in Iraq. By using the patterns and dynamics of revolution in an analytical framework, one can gain insight into the challenges to be faced in Iraq. One can also gain insight into the actions the Coalition will need to take to modify the patterns and dynamics of revolution to achieve its objectives in Iraq.

This paper will first establish the basis for the premise that revolution has been imposed in Iraq. Second, it will review the classic patterns and dynamics associated with the revolutionary overthrow of a government as presented by Crane Brinton in his seminal work, *Anatomy of a Revolution*.³ Next, it will demonstrate that these patterns can be seen in the developments in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Following that, it will explore the implications that these patterns and their underlying dynamics have for the future course of events in Iraq. It will also explore factors that may act as variables to modify the dynamics and the resulting patterns of events. Finally, the paper will present recommendations for the 'way ahead' in Iraq based on the foregoing analysis.

REVOLUTION IN IRAQ?

Iraq is a country with a history of repressive, autocratic rule; dominance of the government by a relatively small segment of the population; and centuries of sectarian strife between Sunni and Shia Arabs, Kurds, and a number of other ethnic or religious minorities. It has no real democratic tradition and only fleeting experience with representative institutions.⁴ For nearly the last 50 years, Iraq has seen a series of coups bringing small cliques and dictators to power. It also witnessed the rise of the Ba'ath Party, elements of which have controlled the Iraqi government for over 40 years.⁵ For most of the last 25 years, Saddam Hussein has governed

Iraq.⁶ Throughout all this time, and for decades before, the relatively small Sunni Arab community has dominated the governance of Iraq.⁷

The Coalition invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the removal of Saddam Hussein, and the dismantling of his regime brought an abrupt end to the most recent chapter in Iraq's political history. It opened the door to significant political and sociological change by giving the Shia Arabs the potential to become a ruling majority and by giving the Kurds the potential to have a significant role in Iraqi government.⁸ For all Iraqis, it has provided the potential for Iraq to adopt a more democratic form of government, where all the elements of their society can be represented.⁹ For Iraq, the potential is revolutionary.

That a significant majority of the Iraqi people want to realize the potential for change that the Coalition ouster of Saddam Hussein provided is evident from the recent elections for the Transitional National Legislature (TNL). Despite significant threat of violence from insurgent elements in Iraq, voter turnout was strong. Nationwide, nearly 60 percent of the electorate voted, despite the threat of violence from insurgent elements.¹⁰ The zeal and expectation of forging a new destiny for Iraq was evident among the majority of the Iraqi people.¹¹ Thousands walked miles just to be able to vote, and celebrations were evident throughout Iraq.¹² It is clear that a revolution is, indeed, in progress. The Iraqi people may not have risen to overthrow their government, but they are rising to shape it for the future.

THE DYNAMICS AND PATTERNS OF REVOLUTION

In the 1965 revision of his work, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, Crane Brinton outlines a number of 'uniformities' that he associates with socio-political revolutions that entail the violent overthrow and replacement of an existing government.¹³ These 'uniformities' encompass a number of social, economic, and political conditions, trends, and dynamics that created common patterns in the revolutions studied. While his work focused on the English Revolution of the 1640s (and its sequel in 1688), and the American, French, and Russian revolutions, the patterns and their underlying dynamics that he identified have generally held true for more contemporary revolutions.¹⁴ Also, even though his work is based on revolutions in generally Western cultures, Brinton and other scholars have identified similar patterns and dynamics in non-Western revolutions, including Algeria, China,¹⁵ and the 1979 Iranian Revolution.¹⁶

Brinton parses the course of a revolution into a number of stages in his analysis. The first stage he examines can be termed the 'Pre-revolutionary' stage. This is the period that is the immediate prelude to the overthrow of the existing government. In this stage, he identifies a number of factors that appear to be enabling conditions for revolution.¹⁷

The first of these 'Pre-revolutionary' factors is a general ineptitude of the government. It is indecisive in dealing with opportunity and crisis, both externally and domestically. The machinery of government is inefficient and ineffective.¹⁸ Typically, the government is beset with financial difficulties.¹⁹ It fails to react consistently or decisively, even to threats to its own power. The government often fails to use force when needed. When it does generate the resolve to use force, the government is typically sporadic and ineffective in its application.²⁰ The government is not usually blind to its shortcoming, but it is no more skilled in its attempts to reform than it is in its other endeavors. In the end, it lacks the will to carry its reforms through.²¹

Two accompanying conditions arise, in part, from this government ineptitude. There is a general abandonment of support of the government by the country's intellectuals. Instead, they transfer their 'allegiance' to a higher ideal of government.²² Concurrently, there is a general loss of faith and self-confidence among that portion of the population that constitutes the ruling class. They grow disillusioned and question their own right to rule.²³ As a class, they become "... markedly unsuited ... to rule."²⁴ This, in turn, feeds the ineptness and indecisiveness of the government.

Another factor is a sense of frustration of legitimate ambitions (usually economic) on the part of a significant portion of the population. This usually develops at a point where popular expectations were on the rise, but the government somehow stymies the perceived opportunities. The government is seen as the obstacle to the realization of these ambitions and is viewed as unfairly keeping the people from making better lives for themselves.²⁵

These conditions lead to two dynamics. The sense of frustration opens up the populace to alternate ideas of government and provides a motivation to action. There is a coalescing of the popular ideals of government.²⁶ During the French Revolution, the slogan of 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity' encapsulated the popular ideal.²⁷

The second dynamic is the rise of organizations that bring into association both the 'men of ideas' and the 'men of action' of the revolution. These organizations become the 'organs of revolution.' In their day, the Jacobin clubs in France and the soviets in Russia were the 'organs of revolution.' In time, these organizations provide a structure for action.²⁸

These conditions, it seems, need only the right catalyst to spark open rebellion. When the uprising comes, a key 'uniformity' that Brinton highlights is that the government is singularly unsuccessful in its use of force to put down the revolution and maintain control. In fact, at this point the government seems to have lost effective control of the forces it could bring to bear to quell the uprising. Indeed, some of these forces actually join the revolution.²⁹

Once the initial violent first stage of revolution has taken place and the old government has been deposed, Brinton sees two patterns developing. The first is an attempt at counter-revolution by the remnants of the old regime. These reactionaries can cause considerable turbulence, but the tide is against them. With limited popular support, these remnants are fighting a losing battle.³⁰

The second pattern comes into being because the revolutionaries now must govern. This sets into motion the key socio-political dynamic, or series of dynamics, detailed in Brinton's work. The pattern begins with a sort of 'honeymoon' period that sees the revolutionary moderates step up and take the reins of government.³¹ The success of sweeping away the old regime creates a popular exhilaration—as well as high expectations—that results in a period of tolerance as the new government forms. The revolutionary moderates are seen by the populace as the natural successors to the former regime, and they take up the reins of government and attempt to return some normalcy to life.³²

As the moderates take power, they adopt what remains in place of the structure and organs of the old regime as the quickest way to restore normalcy to life. These structures—with all their old inefficiencies—hobble the moderates. With this handicap, they fail to meet the high popular expectations for immediate improvement in government and society. This, of course, leads to renewed popular frustration.³³

This growing frustration, in turn, opens the door to the next part of the pattern—the rise of the extremists. The revolutionary extremists leverage the growing popular frustration and manipulate the 'organs of revolution'—which the moderates left in their control as they moved to take the reins of government—to shunt aside the moderates and take control. In the process, the extremists have no compunction about destroying the legacy structures of the old regime.³⁴ The extremists are not any more adept than the moderates at governing, but they are much more ruthless in gaining and retaining power.³⁵ Their efforts to retain control and to mold both politics and society give rise to the 'Reign of Terror and Virtue.' This is a violent period of struggle, not only for control of government but to stamp the ideals of the extremists upon the population as a whole.³⁶

The strain of life under the crisis period of the 'Terror' appears to eventually wear the population down and to dampen the general revolutionary zeal. Coincident with this are a consolidation of power and the elimination of the worst of the extremists. There is a strong socio-political shift toward stability through centralized control.³⁷

This brings us to the last part of the pattern: "Thermidor."³⁸ This stage is a kind of convalescence from the convulsions of the revolution. A characteristic of this stage is a

correction back toward the center from the extremist 'fringe.' Institutions of government appear that are not all that different from what existed under the old regime, though without the worst of its inefficiencies and abuses. There may be periods of relapse into the 'Terror', but these will dwindle.³⁹

In the end, the socio-political change realized is much more evolutionary in appearance than revolutionary. One can envision the process as a kind of pendular motion that starts at the center, swings left through the rule of the moderates, continues further left with the rise of the extremists, then shifts back toward the center (though not wholly so) with Thermidor.⁴⁰

While the above description greatly simplifies Brinton's work, it does highlight the common patterns and dynamics of revolution. With the premise that a revolution is in progress in Iraq, one should expect to see these same dynamics and patterns developing there. These patterns and dynamics, however, may not fit the classic patterns precisely because of the 'imposed' nature of the revolution. The next section will assess the course of events in Iraq to date and determine the degree of convergence with Brinton's classic patterns.

DYNAMICS AND PATTERNS IN IRAQ

Looking at the events in Iraq over the past twenty-two months, there appears to be a distinct correlation with the patterns and dynamics Brinton outlined for the stages of revolution that follow the overthrow of the old regime. There are, however, a number of deviations from the patterns and dynamics, particularly in the early stages. The most significant deviations appear to be in the 'Pre-revolutionary' stage. The analysis shows that almost none of the enabling conditions that Brinton outlined were set prior to the Coalition invasion.

For all its faults, Saddam Hussein's regime was not inept. It was brutal and repressive, but the regime maintained a firm grip on Iraq.⁴¹ Its systems of both political and social control were firmly entrenched, and the government was both swift and decisive in dealing with perceived threats.⁴² Although under intense international pressure since Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, the regime skillfully manipulated the United Nations (UN) and other international actors as the recent Oil-for-Food Program scandal shows.⁴³

Not surprisingly, the ruling class (primarily Sunni, but not exclusively so) was in general support of Saddam and his regime. While there was some opposition within the ruling class, it was limited. Nor was there any real sense of disillusionment or questioning of their right to rule. The primary opposition to Saddam came from the Shia and Kurd communities—neither of which constituted any significant part of the ruling elite of Iraq.⁴⁴

These segments of Iraqi society did, however, have their own structures and hierarchies for organized action. Among the Kurds, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) served as political organs and even controlled paramilitary forces.⁴⁵ Among the Shia, a hierarchy of clerics—the Hawza--served as the organizers and motivators of their people.⁴⁶ In the past, both Kurds and Shia had individually risen against Saddam, but Hussein had ruthlessly crushed their opposition.⁴⁷

While there was opposition to Saddam among Iraqi intellectuals, there was no general 'transfer of allegiance' by this class. Consequently there was no coalescing of thought on the alternatives to Saddam and the Ba'athist regime. Certainly, there was no well-spring spreading the ideals of 'democracy' within Iraq.

Finally, there was no building sense of frustration on the part of significant segments of Iraqi society. The obstacles and limitations to economic, political, and social enterprise had been in place for decades under Saddam. Additionally, the UN sanctions emplaced in the early 1990s were steadily draining any prospects for potential general economic improvement.⁴⁸ Corruption within the UN Oil-for-Food Program did, however, enable Saddam to amass wealth for both himself and his regime.⁴⁹ For most Iraqis, however, it was the same controlled and repressive atmosphere they had known for much of their lives. There were no rising expectations to be blocked—just the status quo.⁵⁰

Of all the prelude conditions that Brinton outlines, the only one that came close to being met in pre-Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Iraq was the creation of organizations and associations outside of the government that could motivate significant segments of the population. There were, however, almost none of the motivating factors that would have made Iraq ripe for rising up against Saddam. Nor was there anything to give impetus toward a more democratic form of government after Saddam was removed. Based on this analysis, the Coalition expectation that significant portions of the Iraqi people would rise up and assist in the overthrow of Saddam and the creation of a democratic Iraq was fundamentally flawed.

Without the necessary conditions set, the Coalition invasion of Iraq can be viewed less as a catalyst for revolution and more of a forcing function. Still, the toppling of Saddam Hussein and his regime appears to have set in motion dynamics that—to an extent--mirror those of Brinton's work. Without the full array of enabling conditions in place, however, the dynamics have been somewhat skewed.

Like the revolutions in Brinton's analysis, the toppling of the old regime in Iraq generated an immediate rise in popular excitement and expectations. In the Shia-dominated south, the Kurdish north, and even in cosmopolitan cities like Baghdad and Mosul, there was an immediate

mood of celebration and hope. The expectations of most, however, were not about ushering in a new form of government in Iraq. The highest expectations of most of the populace dealt with improvements in their quality of life. The Iraqi people had a vision of the quality of life in the West, and they expected the Coalition to bring it with them along with their soldiers, tanks, and planes. They expected more electricity, more fuel, better water, better sewage, trash removal, and a chance at economic improvement.⁵¹ The Shia, too, expected the freedom to follow their forms of worship in the practice of Islam.⁵² The Iraqis were now looking for a revolution, but an economic and social one, rather than a political one.

Very much in keeping with Brinton's dynamics, there was clearly an initial 'honeymoon' period following the fall of the Hussein regime. For a time, hope for the future created a window of tolerance for the Coalition and, eventually, the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG).⁵³ While very much open to debate, the 'honeymoon' can be seen as lasting from the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 and ending just prior to the uprisings in An Najaf and Fallujah in the spring of 2004. This period, which saw the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), shares all the hallmarks of the 'rule of the moderates.'

The establishment of the CPA and IGC can be seen as the beginning of the 'rule of the moderates.' The primary objectives of the CPA were very much like those of Brinton's moderates. The CPA looked primarily to establish an adequate level of stability in Iraq and return a sense of normalcy to the daily lives of ordinary Iraqis. While they would help guide the Iraqis toward democracy, the ultimate question of what form of government the Iraqis would have was left to the Iraqis.

Also like Brinton's moderates, the CPA utilized many of the legacy structures of the former government.⁵⁴ While the CPA did abolish the Ba'athist Party and disbanded Iraq's armed forces, it reestablished a number of national ministries and other civil administration structures virtually intact.⁵⁵ In some cases, they maintained many of the same personnel who ran these bureaucracies under Saddam Hussein.⁵⁶ While this provided the CPA, and later the IIG, with a ready structure of administration, it also preserved a number of the abuses and inefficiencies of the old system. In some cases, these institutions carried such baggage that they were eventually dissolved and built from the ground up—the police, in particular.⁵⁷ These abuses and inefficiencies, however, quickly began to wear down the tolerance of the population. The CPA further cemented the 'rule of the moderates' in how it reached out to Iraqi leadership to take part in the IGC and the governance of Iraq. By design, the CPA sought out moderates among various Iraqi factions and sought their participation in governing.⁵⁸ The IIG, when it was finally formed, was very much a government of moderates.⁵⁹

Like the moderates of Brinton's model, the CPA and the IIG were both unable to meet the unreasonably high expectations of the populace. Iraqis looked for significant improvements in their quality of life, while the CPA sought only to restore Iraq to its pre-war status. Based on poor execution, even meeting this minimalist goal was difficult. Needless to say, the failure to realize the heightened expectations of the Iraqi populace led to an increased sense of frustration and a further eroding of the tolerance given to the CPA and the IGC. This, as in Brinton's dynamics, opened the door for the rise of the 'extremists.'

Muqtada al-Sadr is one of the earliest examples of the dynamic that leads to the 'accession of the extremists.' His case also shows some distinct departures from the Brinton model. The son of an influential Shia cleric murdered by Saddam Hussein, Muqtada al-Sadr was a relatively minor figure in the loose hierarchy of Shia clerics in Iraq.⁶⁰ He first gained notoriety when he was implicated in the murder of Majid al-Khoei, an influential expatriate cleric who returned to Iraq with the fall of Saddam.⁶¹ The government, both CPA and IIG, failed to move decisively against him at that time, for a number of reasons.

Muqtada al-Sadr, however, quickly adopted an anti-Coalition stance and became more and more visible in his preaching. Leveraging the growing discontent with the 'moderates,' he built a significant following, including an armed, militant arm.⁶² In the spring of 2004 he and his militia sparked an armed uprising in An Najaf and nearby towns.⁶³ The uprising was put down, but only after extended fighting and great embarrassment to the Coalition and the IIG.⁶⁴ The Sadr situation was defused in the end, only by the intervention of the leading Shia cleric in Iraq, al-Sistani.⁶⁵ In the end, al-Sadr was sidelined, but not eliminated. In the process, he maneuvered from being a minor entity in Shia politics to major figure—potentially rivaling al-Sistani.

Sistani's intervention, and its success, shows a distinct deviation from the pattern illustrated by Brinton. In this case, while al-Sadr tried to hijack the Shia organizational mechanisms, he ultimately failed because al-Sistani had maintained control of them—and because, after initial restraint, the Coalition was willing to move decisively against al-Sadr. Whether al-Sistani can maintain his control within the Shia community is yet to be seen.

The establishment of the al-Zarqawi network in Iraq can be seen as another example of the dynamic enabling the rise of the 'extremists,' although with a number of caveats. In this case, the dynamic is seen working among the Sunni population and leveraging Wahhabist extremism.⁶⁶ The primary caveat with al-Zarqawi is that he, and many in his network, are not Iraqi. In addition, it can be argued that al-Zarqawi and his network are actors on another stage entirely based on their association with al-Qaeda.⁶⁷ Their appeal and support in Iraq at this

time, however, has everything to do with the social forces trending to extremism as a result of frustration with the government of the 'moderates.'

The past year has clearly shown a trend toward the growth and strengthening of extremist elements throughout most of Iraq.⁶⁸ As the frustration of the populace grew and patience wore thin, the dynamic towards extremism—to achieve 'utopian' change now—gained momentum. While al-Sadr and al-Zarqawi are two of the more prominent examples, there are a number of others throughout much of Iraq.⁶⁹

It should be noted at this point that there has been no obvious dynamic toward extremism in the Kurd-dominated areas. This is likely the case for two reasons. First, Barzani and Talabani maintain tight control of the Kurdish organizational structures. Second, there has been distinctly less turbulence among Kurdish society due to the overthrow of Saddam than elsewhere in the country—so normalcy has not been interrupted to any great degree. Third, there was not the same degree of heightened expectation, particularly in relation to quality of life, as there was in much of the rest of Iraq. The Kurds key expectations appear to turn much more on what their role in the future government of Iraq will be. So far, their expectations have not been frustrated, but neither have they been definitively met.

In the twenty-two months since the fall of the Hussein regime, Iraq has displayed another of the dynamics identified by Brinton: the 'counter-revolution' dynamic. A significant portion of the violence in Iraq since the fall of the regime can be attributed to this dynamic. It appears that Saddam may actually have planned to enable this dynamic, dispersing agents, funds, equipment, and fighters to energize a guerilla campaign against the Coalition.⁷⁰ Despite significant attrition of key leaders, to include the capture of Saddam, the 'counter-revolutionists' have waged a steady campaign against the Coalition and the IIG.⁷¹ Their tenacity to date is somewhat of a departure from Brinton's model. The deviation, however, can be traced to the lack of enabling conditions being set. The Sunnis had not lost faith as the ruling class and it appears the Sunni community in Iraq is providing significant support to the counter-revolutionary effort. The 'Sunni Triangle' remains a hotbed of violence, and while much of it is attributed to 'extremists' a significant portion remains the work of those who would reinstate the old regime, or at least the old ruling class.⁷²

In summary, the toppling of Saddam Hussein appears to have precipitated dynamics in Iraq that mirror those outlined by Brinton. The 'counter-revolutionary' dynamic exists and retains significant strength and capability. The 'rule of the moderates' continues, but with the 'honeymoon' over and growing tendencies toward the dynamic allowing accession of the extremists. A caveat here is the impact of the recent elections for the Transitional National

Legislature (TNL). Despite dire predictions, the elections seemed to be very successful and appear, at least in the short term, to have strengthened the position of the 'moderates.'

IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ'S FUTURE

The foregoing analysis indicates that Brinton's patterns and dynamics of revolution are active—albeit somewhat modified—in Iraq. The question now arises, what are the implications of this for Iraq's future? Will the socio-political forces in play in Iraq carry everything along in pre-determined patterns, or can deliberate action be taken to modify the patterns and thereby enhance achievement of Coalition objectives?

A simple extrapolation of events in Iraq using Brinton's patterns and dynamics is not very encouraging. If the patterns hold true, the reactionary elements (former regime loyalists) of the current insurgencies in Iraq will be defeated. The Iraqi moderates, however, will also fail (and with them the Coalition vision for Iraq). They will be unable to stabilize Iraq and establish effective governmental control. Instead, they will come under increasing attack by radical elements (both Iraqi and foreign extremists) seeking more extreme change in Iraq. The influence of the radicals will grow with the frustration and dissatisfaction of the population. Eventually, the radicals will shunt the moderates aside—most likely forcibly—and assume control of the government. When this happens, the Coalition will likely be directed to withdraw from Iraq.

The rise of these extremists will, in turn, usher in the 'Reign of Terror and Virtue.' Iraq will be racked with violence. Extremist factions will maneuver against one another for power and control. At the same time, they will force their extreme ideals on the rest of the population. 'Survival of the fittest' will be the rule of the day.

There is a high likelihood that the turbulence generated in Iraq will spill over into other countries in the region. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Kuwait are all vulnerable to unrest. It could destabilize the entire region.

There is also the potential that the turbulence in Iraq would invite a forceful reaction by one of its neighbors. Turkey could easily become involved if they perceived a threat to the Turkomen enclaves in Iraq.⁷³ Iran, too, could opt for a forceful intervention should it appear that the Shia community in Iraq were being threatened.⁷⁴ A Kurdish threat of separatism could invite forceful responses from Turkey, Syria, and Iran, as well as from the Iraqi Arab communities.⁷⁵ Without the Coalition to ensure its territorial integrity and with its military relatively untried, Iraq will be extremely vulnerable to outside intervention.

The turbulence and violence will result in a gradual centralization of power under the 'fittest' of the radical elements. Most likely, a single faction (or individual) will consolidate power and eliminate all other rivals. Iraq will have returned to autocratic rule, with one segment of society dominating all others, and little that reflects either a democratic form of government or representative institutions.

Based on their current position in Iraq, it is likely that the Shia Arab majority will be the segment of society that comes to control the government. They have already secured a commanding role in the TNL, based on the emerging results of the recent elections. A potential trajectory along these lines sees moderate Shia working with the Kurds and Sunnis to craft a national constitution acceptable to all. This process could fail outright to produce a constitution or it could produce a constitution that alienates both the Kurdish and Sunni minorities. Either case would undermine the moderates that currently hold the reins of government and would open the door to the radicals.

Once in control, the radicals would begin to rebuild both government and society to more closely conform to Shia Islamic ideals. The secular aspects of Iraqi government would likely be erased. The dynamics would run their course akin to the Iranian revolution, with the pattern ending with Iraq under the control of an Arab Shia theocracy.⁷⁶

To hold Iraq together under such a system, the Shia would have to have firm control over both the Sunnis and the Kurds. It seems likely that under this scenario, both of these segments of Iraqi society would come into strong conflict with the Shia. The potential for civil war would be very high. With only a fledgling military, it is unlikely that any revolt by Sunni Arabs and/or Kurds could be controlled quickly. Failure on the Shia part, however, would likely plunge the country into anarchy.⁷⁷

A civil war in Iraq would almost assuredly attract a wide array of regional and international actors to influence the outcome.⁷⁸ With only limited military resources, the Arab Shia factions would be hard-pressed to keep external actors out. Since the interests of a number of countries converge in Iraq, the intervention of one country will invite the counteractions of others.⁷⁹ In a short time, the entire region may become embroiled and destabilized.⁸⁰

While less likely, radicals could rise from other sources. One such scenario would see radical elements gaining control of the Sunni Arab population and leading them forcibly back into their 'hereditary' position of power and control in Iraq.⁸¹ This would undoubtedly precipitate civil war, leading to regional destabilization and possibly anarchy.

Another scenario sees each major element of Iraqi society splitting along geo-political lines and partitioning the country into three independent states, each ruled by the radicals of

that population.⁸² Turkey, Iran, and Syria would all likely move against an independent Kurdish state.⁸³ Iran might also move to bolster the Shia state against any threat. This scenario, too, likely results in regional destabilization.

AFFECTING THE PATTERN

While Brinton's work seems to suggest that, once set into motion, the patterns of revolution and their underlying dynamics are a foregone conclusion, this is not necessarily the case for Iraq. To start with, there are three major deviations in Iraq from Brinton's model which suggest the potential for modifying the classic patterns. Coupled with these deviations, Brinton's own work implies there are a number of variables that could be manipulated to modify the basic patterns and dynamics. These may provide avenues for the Coalition to favorably affect the final pattern that emerges in Iraq.

The first deviation that needs to be considered is the 'tri-furcated' nature of Iraqi demographics. Iraq is split into three major groups that are ethnically, religiously, and geographically distinct. The Sunni Arabs, the Shia Arabs, and the Kurds represent major 'fault lines' in Iraqi society and in Iraqi demographic geography.⁸⁴ The Shia Arabs dominate the southern and southeastern provinces of Iraq, while the Sunnis dominate the west and northwest. The Kurds dominate the northeastern provinces of Iraq. These divisions have stood for centuries.⁸⁵ While there are other groups of note (Turkomen, etc.), these three are the most significant.⁸⁶ As noted earlier, the patterns and dynamics at work in each of these major segments of society are subtly different. The interplay between these groups opens up an avenue for affecting the overall patterns and dynamics not seen in Brinton's revolutionary model.⁸⁷

The second deviation is the lack of the 'Pre-revolutionary' conditions being set prior to the overthrow of Saddam. While the patterns and dynamics in Iraq up to this point have reflected Brinton's classic patterns relatively closely, the lack of these enabling conditions brings into question whether the forces that were set into motion have enough inertia to carry the full pattern through. In particular, the Iraqi population may not have been infused with enough 'revolutionary zeal' to open the door wide to the excesses of the radicals.

The third deviation is the presence and action of the Coalition itself. An external entity like the Coalition is not a part of Brinton's basic model. It opens another potential avenue for modifying Brinton's patterns. While certain Coalition actions seem to actually be part of the pattern as noted above, there are important caveats. The Coalition has a functional structure that the radicals in Iraq will not be able to subvert the way the radicals subvert the 'organs of

revolution.’ In particular, the Coalition firmly controls a significant military force, an advantage the moderates in Brinton’s model do not have.

The Coalition also serves to shield, in part, the Iraqi moderates from the worst of public criticism and discontent. The Coalition, rather than the fledgling Iraq government, bears the brunt of public dissatisfaction.⁸⁸ This gives the moderates more time to become effective in governing and diverts the subversive focus of the radicals.⁸⁹ This benefit is of only limited utility. If popular discontent builds up too much, the Coalition will have to depart. Indeed, the moderate government may find itself in the position to have to ask the Coalition to withdraw. The moderate government, then, will be left to its own devices.

Although not well publicized, the Coalition also brings considerable financial, economic, technical, and diplomatic resources to bear in Iraq. It has enabled significant strides in improving conditions in Iraq, especially in basic infrastructure, essential services, and economic opportunity.⁹⁰ Many projects, however, are still in progress so that the Iraqi populace has yet to realize the benefit from them. If these projects can be brought to fruition, they have the potential to going a long way to meeting popular expectations for an improvement in quality of life and economic opportunity.⁹¹ If a significant number of these projects can be brought to completion during the tenure of the TNL, it is possible for the credit to accrue to the moderates and to help cement their hold on government.⁹²

The diplomat resources of the Coalition have had significant impact, also. The Coalition’s diplomatic efforts serve to significantly reduce the external threats to Iraq. Diplomatic pressure on Turkey, Iran, and Syria has served to prevent any overt opportunism by these countries in Iraq and has limited their less overt activities.⁹³ Coalition diplomatic action has also served to delay the resolution of potentially divisive issues such as the disposition of the Mujahadeen e-Kalkh (MeK) and the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK).

While these three deviations from Brinton’s model suggest avenues for action to modify the classic patterns and dynamics, Brinton’s own work seems to imply there are a number of variables which can also modify the patterns. His work suggests these variables are normally beyond the control of the moderates and so they normally have no ability to affect the pattern. The deviations outlined above, particularly the participation of the Coalition, present the possibility in the case of Iraq of manipulating some of these variables.

Brinton’s work presents seven areas that might act as variables on the patterns and dynamics. These areas are: leadership⁹⁴; control of the instruments of government⁹⁵; control of the ‘revolutionary power base’⁹⁶; economic well-being⁹⁷; external threats⁹⁸; internal threats⁹⁹; and

sectarian frictions.¹⁰⁰ Each of these areas can either positively or negatively affect the patterns and dynamics.

The most obvious weakness in the moderate leadership in Brinton's model is its inexperience with running the government. While not totally unskilled, it is still daunted by the full scope of national governance.¹⁰¹ An insidious failing on the part of the moderate leadership compounds this weakness. The moderate leadership of Brinton's model lacks the force of will to make things work.¹⁰² It is unwilling to bring its more radical 'revolutionary brothers' to heel.¹⁰³ It is unable to stand firm in the face of popular discontent in the short-term in order to realize longer-term reforms and benefits. The moderate leadership is too open to compromise in order to avoid conflict.¹⁰⁴ As a result, its policies and programs become half-measures that are inefficient and ineffective. This, in turn, breeds popular dissatisfaction with the government and increases frustration. All this plays into the hands of the radicals who use it to undermine the moderates.¹⁰⁵

The IIG clearly fit the mold of Brinton's moderate-led governments. There is little question that the IIG was more than challenged by the requirements of national government—even as an interim government with significant Coalition oversight. It backed away from moving against Muqtada al-Sadr, first when he was implicated in the murder of al-Khoei and again later when he was in open rebellion. Despite the IIG's attempts at negotiation and compromise, al-Sadr did not back down until al-Sistani brought him under control.¹⁰⁶

The IIG backed away, also, from moving decisively against the uprising in Fallujah. Instead, it again sought compromise and accommodation.¹⁰⁷ Only when the situation had deteriorated to the point where it was clear that al-Zarqawi literally held the town hostage and threatened to spark rebellion throughout the Sunni Triangle, was the IIG forced to concede to decisive action.¹⁰⁸ Even with the recent elections for the TNL, the IIG counseled compromise and delay because of the Arab Sunni boycott.

The Coalition can take a number of actions to affect the leadership variable. It should make a concerted effort to coach, teach, mentor and advise the emerging Iraqi leadership. Such an effort should be Coalition-wide, with a variety of countries providing mentors and advisors to enhance the competence and confidence of the leaders of the Transitional Government (TG) and the TNL in assuming the mantle of national government. The Coalition should also take steps to help bolster the resolve of the government to carry through unpopular, but necessary, policies and programs through targeted campaigns of private communications and public diplomacy. These efforts would be designed to reinforce the confidence and conviction of key leaders. The Coalition should also apply its Strategic Communications

capabilities to influence local leaders and the populace to stand firm and support the TG and TNL.

The Coalition should also take action to help protect key moderate leaders from assassination. A tactic already seen in Iraq is the elimination of moderate leadership by both reactionary and radical elements through violence. The most likely targets will be those moderate leaders with the greatest competence, resolve, and force of will. With the recent election of the TNL, it is not yet clear who precisely these leaders are. The Coalition must make a concerted effort to quickly assess the emerging leadership of the TNL and identify who the likely key figures will be.

There are many actions the Coalition can take to enhance the competence and confidence of the moderate leadership. In general, these actions should help the moderates to withstand the challenge of the radicals and retain control. The Coalition, however, will have to tread a fine line in its actions—the U.S., in particular. The Coalition approach to moderate leaders must be subtle or it will undermine these leaders by ‘tainting’ them as Coalition puppets.¹⁰⁹ The Coalition must support and assist, without giving the perception of trying to control.

The second variable is degree of control of the institutions of government. In Brinton's model, the moderates fail to establish effective control of the government before the radicals move against them.¹¹⁰ As mentioned earlier, the sheer magnitude of suddenly assuming national government is nearly overwhelming in its challenges. The task is made even more difficult by the need to replace governmental institutions that were dismantled in the overthrow of the old regime. The intact ‘legacy’ structures, however, are often as much a hindrance as a help to the moderates. They tend to hobble the new government with the inefficiencies and corruption of the systems of the old regime. As they move to gain control of the arms of government—and to reform some of them—the moderates find themselves assailed by both conservatives and radicals. One claims that the moderates are changing too much, the other that the changes are not enough.¹¹¹

The result is that the moderates never manage to consolidate their control of the institutions of government. Rather than wielding diplomatic, informational, economic, and military organs of government as components of coherent instruments of power, the moderates struggle with the direction of agencies that are fractured, inefficient, or incomplete. Factional divisions arise within agencies that further disrupt the unity of effort of the government. Inefficiency and ineffectiveness remain, thereby leading to increasing discontent on the part of

the population. The radicals, in turn, leverage these circumstances, developing and strengthening their factions within the fractious arms of the government.¹¹²

This dynamic can easily be seen in Iraq today. Neither the CPA nor the IIG ever established firm control of the institutions of government. Some ministries were dismantled completely and have yet to be replaced by another entity.¹¹³ Other ministries were re-established, but are today some are accused of some of the same inefficiencies and abuses that existed under Saddam Hussein's regime.¹¹⁴ The Iraqi security organizations—the military, police, border security, etc.—were entirely dismantled and are being slowly rebuilt. Even with this total overhaul, these organizations are already suspected of having factions within them controlled by both reactionary and radical elements in Iraq.¹¹⁵ A key to the control of the government, these organizations are already in question.

To affect this variable, the Coalition can either take actions to accelerate the development of proficiency in governing of the moderates or provide more time for them to develop the requisite proficiency. Either course will strengthen the hand of the moderates in staving off the inevitable challenge of the radicals. The Coalition is already doing much to assist the Iraqis in the area.

Key Iraqi ministries have been restructured and reformed with an eye to eliminate inefficiency and corruption. This work was initiated under the CPA and continued under the IIG. It will unquestionably continue under the TG. The Coalition should work closely with the TG to ensure continued forward progress in reforming and restructuring the ministries and other institutions of civil government. With a new government coming to power, there will be the potential for backsliding in the bureaucracies that must be guarded against.

While there have been a number of setbacks in building Iraqi security organizations, many earlier mistakes have been corrected. The rate of producing security forces has been rationalized based on the resources available to train and equip them. There is a more comprehensive vetting regimen in place to enhance the professionalism and prevent the factionalization of these organizations. The Coalition must continue to help the Iraqis create these key arms of government.

A recurring suggestion for the Coalition is to accelerate the establishment of the Iraqi military and other Iraqi security agencies, particularly the police. While having a full-fledged security capability quickly is desirable, it is far more critical that these institutions be developed in a way that their loyalty to the legally constituted government is concrete. Acceleration is desirable only so long as it does not detract from building an institutional professionalism and loyalty to the legal government.

This means that units must be allowed to complete their full training regimen before being fielded. Additionally, they must be adequately equipped before being expected to perform their duties. Failing to do so earlier produced disastrous results.¹¹⁶ In addition, the vetting processes that have been established must be allowed to function properly. All this will limit the rate at which security forces can be produced. The Coalition must continue to help develop these organizations at a controlled rate to ensure the final product is one that will serve well long into the future.

Mentors, advisors, and technical experts have been provided to the national governmental organizations to help the Iraqi leadership to develop competence and expertise.¹¹⁷ These should remain to assist the TNL and TG as they take up the reins of Iraqi government. As discussed above, the Coalition must exercise care with how they approach and assist the TNL and TG so that these leaders are not undermined or alienated. These leaders must be seen as leading the process, with the Coalition strictly in a supporting role.

While the degree of control over the institutions of government is important, control of the power structures that exist outside of government is equally important. In Brinton's model, the moderates who step up into the initial revolutionary government were typically the leaders of the associations and organizations that became the 'organs of revolution.' When they stepped into government, however, they found themselves too busy to continue to lead these 'organs.' The radicals were then able to assume control of the revolutionary power structures and turn them to their own purposes.¹¹⁸ These became the powerbase from which the radicals were able to shunt aside the moderates and take control of the government. By ceding control of the revolutionary power structures, the moderate leadership undermined itself by ceding one of their most important constituencies.¹¹⁹

In Iraq today, there are a variety of power structures outside the government. Some of these are well-established, such as the Arab Shia association of clerics; the Dawa Party; the Kurdish KDP and PUK structures; the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI); and the Iraqi tribal structure.¹²⁰ Some of these are newly emerging, as political organizations and other associations are formed.¹²¹ Currently, al-Sistani appears to be maintaining firm control of the main Shia cleric association. He, of course, has taken no direct role in government.¹²² This may provide a useful deviation from Brinton's classic pattern—and al-Sistani's ability to make al-Sadr back down may be a direct result. The KDP and PUK structures appear to be firmly controlled by Barzani and Talabani, with little challenge to their leadership. In fact, these two organizations appear to be working very closely together to present a united Kurdish face in Iraqi politics. The degree of control of moderates within the

tribal structure and the nascent political organizations across Iraq is unclear at this point. These will have to be assessed in more detail as the TNL and TG begin to function.

The Coalition will likely find it has little ability to influence what elements retain control of these various organizations. Resistance to Coalition influence will likely be high from all parties involved, including the moderates. One key action the Coalition can take is to assist in the protection of key moderate leaders in these organizations. Protecting leaders like al-Sistani from assassination can pay significant dividends. It is essential that the Coalition make a concerted effort to study and analyze the various organizations and associations, to understand their structure, goals, leadership, and relative powerbase.

Economic well-being is another key variable. Each of the revolutionary governments in Brinton's study was faced with a degree of financial crisis. The hardship ensuing from this fed popular discontent with the moderate governments and further opened them to attack by the radicals.¹²³ Financial stability within the government and economic opportunity for the populace would both enhance the position of the moderates.

At a national level, Iraq today possess significant oil reserves and an adequate (if somewhat antiquated and neglected) oil infrastructure.¹²⁴ This asset provides the potential to the government to secure enough fiscal resources to avoid any serious financial crisis.¹²⁵ The full potential of this system has yet to be realized due to the continuing sabotage of the oil infrastructure.¹²⁶ At the regional and local levels, economic opportunity is still extremely limited—a legacy of the Hussein regime. There is, however, enormous potential that the Coalition can help the Iraqi people realize.¹²⁷ This, too, can help the moderates retain control in Iraq.

The Coalition is already doing a number of things to affect this variable. It has invested considerable effort in getting the Iraqi oil industry back up and running. It continues to invest resources in keeping it running. The Coalition must continue to persevere in its efforts to assist the Iraqis preserve this critical resource. In the end, the dividends will be well worth the investment.

The Coalition has also taken a number of diplomatic initiatives to relieve Iraq of a significant portion of its international debt. The result should be a government that is not immediately challenged with financial crises. This will allow the government to focus its efforts in other areas that are critical to the future of Iraq.

At the regional and local levels, the Coalition is also pursuing a number of initiatives to help build the Iraqi economy.¹²⁸ A few efforts, however, need more emphasis. First, the Coalition should invest more effort to internationalize the interest in Iraq at the national, regional,

and even local levels. A concerted effort should be made to reach out beyond the Coalition membership and widen the sphere of economic interest in Iraq.¹²⁹ This will serve to bring more investment to Iraq while at the same time tying the interests of even more countries to the stability and reconstruction of Iraq.

Second, the Coalition should program a reduction in the use of international/foreign contractors and increase the use of Iraqi contractors.¹³⁰ While initially required because Iraqis did not have the means to provide the goods and services the Coalition needed in a timely manner, the use of foreign contractors now is starting to be counterproductive. While the Coalition still receives the goods and services it requires, it loses the added benefit of a financial inject directly into the Iraqi economy. Increased use of Iraqi contractors will provide this 'two for one' benefit.¹³¹ This will serve to provide a greater boost directly to the Iraqi economy, particularly at the regional and local levels.

External threats, in Brinton's model, bring further pressure against the moderate governments. The inclination of the moderates to seek compromise works against them in this area. By compromising, they create a perception of weakness.¹³² This, too, is exploited by the radicals to undermine the moderates. An external threat may even provide the catalyst for the radicals to shunt the moderates aside and take control.¹³³ The moderate government must have the means to adequately counter a likely external threat.

Today, Iraq lacks the means to adequately defend itself from external threats. This capability, in the form of the Iraqi military and its other security forces, is slowly being developed. In the interim, potential overt threats are held at bay by the presence of the Coalition in Iraq and supporting diplomatic action. Covert threats from external sources are more problematic. Coalition presence and action in Iraq, in conjunction with Iraqi efforts, serve to keep covert external threats in check to a degree.¹³⁴ Other than the Zarqawi terrorist network, however, there has not been a significant active external covert threat to Iraq. Iran, Turkey, and Syria all have the potential to engage in hostile covert threat activities in Iraq if they believed their interests were sufficiently threatened.¹³⁵

As discussed above, the Coalition must continue its present programs to help establish and develop the Iraqi military and other security forces. It should also renew the effort to expand the ranks of the Coalition and to expand the number of international forces available in Iraq. This will serve to expand the deterrent effect of the Coalition and improve its ability to maintain a long-term presence, if necessary. The Coalition must be prepared to maintain a 'shield' for Iraq for some time to come.

In Brinton's model, internal threats were an area that the moderates had a difficult time reacting to properly. Internal threats include not only reactionaries and radicals; it also includes criminal organizations and other subversive elements.¹³⁶ If not controlled sufficiently, the action of each serves to undermine the position of the moderates. The impact of these elements in Iraq today is clearly evident.¹³⁷ The moderate government must have the internal security resources to adequately control these internal threats and the will to use them.

The Coalition efforts to help develop Iraqi security forces will help address this variable, as well as that of external threats. So, too, will its own actions in Iraq to maintain order and public safety. In addition, Coalition actions mentioned above that will help strengthen the resolve of the moderate leadership will positively affect this variable. The key is to develop the moderate government so that it can act decisively, but not abusively, against internal threats.

The final variable, and one that can figure prominently in Iraq, is sectarian friction. The greater the friction between the various elements of society, the greater the discontent with the moderate government.¹³⁸ This, too, leads to the undermining of the moderates and provides a catalyst for action by the radicals.¹³⁹

The 'tri-furcated' nature of Iraq, while it serves to modify some of the dynamics of revolution, lends to a significant potential for sectarian friction in Iraq. A number of major 'fault lines' are obvious. The reversal of Arab Shia and Arab Sunni influence in the governing of Iraq is a clear fault line.¹⁴⁰ The Shia will have to resist the inclination to exact revenge on the Sunnis for decades of repression. More, they will have to reach out to the Sunni population in a way that makes the Sunnis feel like they have a stake in the government. If they fail in this, the Sunnis will likely be in perpetual opposition to the government.¹⁴¹

There is also a major 'fault line' between Kurds and Arabs. A particular subject of contention is the lands between the Kurdish and Arab populations of Iraq that have historically changed hands between the two groups. These lands include the city of Kirkuk and its oil-producing region.¹⁴² Both sides feel they have legitimate claim to the lands. A carefully constructed program of reconciliation will need to be executed to avert severe conflict in these areas.¹⁴³

Other minority groups, such as the Turkomen and Assyrians, create other potential 'fault lines' for sectarian friction.¹⁴⁴ In addition, unique organizations like the MeK and the PKK can potentially trigger 'fault lines' at the international level with Iran and Turkey. Each of these will require well-conceived programs of reconciliation and assurance in order to avoid igniting sectarian violence.

The Coalition can do a number of things to assist in reducing sectarian friction. It can provide a source of mediation in the disputes between various groups, providing an unbiased third party. The Coalition can also provide resources to the TG to be used as incentives in reconciliation. This should include assistance in relocating and resettling different groups. It should also include economic incentives for those that may be displaced or dispossessed. The Coalition must maintain its insistence on a representative government, which includes all the major segments of Iraqi society, and assist the TG to achieve it. Influencing the TNL to ensure the Iraqi constitution provides for representation for all major segments of society in the process of government will be critical.¹⁴⁵

THE WAY AHEAD

The Coalition must take deliberate steps to positively affect the outcome in Iraq. In doing so, it must consider the dynamics at work in Iraq and the likely patterns they will produce. As has been outlined above, the dynamics and patterns of revolution are clearly at work in Iraq. The Coalition, therefore, must leverage the deviations from the classic patterns of revolution and manipulate the variables outlined above in order to modify the dynamics and thereby alter the pattern that develops.

In doing this, however, the Coalition must recognize that its role is to assist the Iraqis achieve a stable society and a representative government. The Coalition must coach, teach, and mentor to help guide the Iraqis into paths that will lead to success, but the final solution must be an Iraqi solution if it is to be lasting. So the Coalition must be able to accept an Iraqi solution, as long as it is adequate, even if it is not one the Coalition would have chosen. The Coalition must also maintain the recognition that in this phase in Iraq, 'shock and awe' will not work. Instead, the Coalition must do its work subtly, consistently, and carefully, with its eye on the long-term results and a sensitivity for unintended consequences.

The Coalition must maintain the recognition that it must continue to invest now to achieve a payoff in the long run. The dynamics discussed above may take years to run their full course and for the patterns they create to fully emerge. The Coalition must also maintain the recognition that ugly events in Iraq do not mean that progress is not being made. Violence and turbulence are an inevitable part of the patterns and must be expected. Success in using the variables discussed above will, however, reduce or eliminate the violence in the long run. Perseverance will be key.

The results the Coalition desires in Iraq are, unquestionably, revolutionary. To achieve them, however, requires controlled and sustainable evolution toward a revolutionary endstate.

This is what the moderates in Brinton's model would achieve if they could break free of the tide of dynamics that sweep them away replace them with the radicals. In Iraq, there is a chance to modify the pattern and enable the moderates to succeed.

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⁹⁶ Ibid., 134-135.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 200.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 199.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 200.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 137.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 138.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 123, 146.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 132-135, 137.

¹⁰⁶ Tolson, 27.

¹⁰⁷ Victor Davis Hanson, "The Power of Will: Winning Still Matters," *National Review Online*, 29 October 2004; available from <<http://www.nationalreview.com>>; Internet; accessed on 29 October 2004, 2-3.

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Rabasa, 55.

¹¹⁰ Brinton, 122-123.

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¹¹⁵ Schmitt.

¹¹⁶ Linda Robinson, "A Few Good Men," *U.S. News and World Report*, 14 February 2005, 24-25.

¹¹⁷ Natsios .

¹¹⁸ Brinton, 139.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 148-149.

¹²⁰ Dobbins, 174.

¹²¹ Ibid., 175.

¹²² Ozeroy and Whitelaw, 30.

¹²³ Brinton, 200.

¹²⁴ Dobbins, 211-212.

¹²⁵ Ibid., xxvi.

¹²⁶ Franks, 543.

¹²⁷ Dobbins, 171.

¹²⁸ Natsios .

¹²⁹ Dobbins, 192.

¹³⁰ Eliot Cohen, "A Time for Humility," *Wall Street Journal*, 31 January 2005, 18.

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¹³² Brinton, 144.

¹³³ Ibid., 199.

¹³⁴ Dobbins, 169-170.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Brad Knickerbocker, "A Classic Guerrilla War Forming in Iraq," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 September 2004, 1.

¹³⁷ Dobbins, 177-178.

¹³⁸ Brinton, 50, 57, 60, 64.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 200.

¹⁴⁰ Ozeroy and Whitelaw, 28-29.

¹⁴¹ Ilana Ozeroy, "Democracy Under the Gun," *U.S. News and World Report*, 31 January 2005, 21-22.

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¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ozeroy, 24.

¹⁴⁵ Ozeroy and Whitelaw, 29.

GLOSSARY

CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
IGC	Iraqi Governing Council
IIG	Interim Iraqi Government
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
MeK	Mujahedeen e-Kalkh
OIF	Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PKK	Kurdish Workers Party
SCIRI	Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
TG	Transitional Government
TNL	Transitional National Legislature
UN	United Nations

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